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ABSTRACT
Effective and efficient mitigation of malware is a long-time en-
deavor in the information security community. The development of
an anti-malware system that can counteract an unknown malware
is a prolific activity that may benefit several sectors. We envision
an intelligent anti-malware system that utilizes the power of deep
learning (DL)models. Using suchmodels would enable the detection
of newly-released malware through mathematical generalization.
That is, finding the relationship between a given malware x and
its corresponding malware family y, f : x 7→ y. To accomplish this
feat, we used the Malimg dataset[12] which consists of malware
images that were processed from malware binaries, and then we
trained the following DL models1 to classify each malware family:
CNN-SVM[16], GRU-SVM[3], and MLP-SVM. Empirical evidence
has shown that the GRU-SVM stands out among the DL models
with a predictive accuracy of ≈84.92%. This stands to reason for
the mentioned model had the relatively most sophisticated archi-
tecture design among the presented models. The exploration of an
even more optimal DL-SVM model is the next stage towards the
engineering of an intelligent anti-malware system.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Malware and its mitigation; •Com-
puting methodologies → Supervised learning by classifica-
tion; Support vector machines; Neural networks;
KEYWORDS
artificial intelligence; artificial neural networks; classification; con-
volutional neural networks; deep learning; machine learning; mal-
ware classification; multilayer perceptron; recurrent neural net-
work; supervised learning; support vector machine
1 INTRODUCTION
Effective and efficient mitigation of malware is a long-time en-
deavor in the information security community. The development of
an anti-malware system that can counteract an unknown malware
is a prolific activity that may benefit several sectors.
To intercept an unknown malware or even just an unknown vari-
ant is a laborious task to undertake, and may only be accomplished
by constantly updating the anti-malware signature database. The
mentioned database contains the information on all known mal-
ware by the particular system[15], which is then used for malware
detection. Consequently, newly-released malware which are not
yet included in the database will go undetected.
We envision an intelligent anti-malware system that employs
a deep learning (DL) approach which would enable the detection
1Code available at https://github.com/AFAgarap/malware-classification
of newly-released malware through its capability to generalize on
data. Furthermore, we amend the conventional DL models to use
the support vector machine (SVM) as their classification function.
We take advantage of the Malimg dataset[12] which consists of
visualized malware binaries, and use it to train the DL-SVM models
to classify each malware family.
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Machine Intelligence Library
Google TensorFlow[2] was used to implement the deep learning
algorithms in this study, with the aid of other scientific computing
libraries: matplotlib[8], numpy[17], and scikit-learn[13].
2.2 The Dataset
The deep learning (DL) models in this study were evaluated on
the Malimg dataset[12], which consists of 9,339 malware samples
from 25 different malware families. Table 1 shows the frequency
distribution of malware families and their variants in the Malimg
dataset[12].
Figure 1: Image from [12]. Visualizing malware as a
grayscale image.
Nataraj et al. (2011)[12] created the Malimg dataset by reading
malware binaries into an 8-bit unsigned integer composing a matrix
M ∈ Rm×n . The said matrix may be visualized as a grayscale image
having values in the range of [0, 255], with 0 representing black
and 1 representing white.
2.3 Dataset Preprocessing
Similar to what [6] did, the malware images were resized to a 2-
dimensional matrix of 32 × 32, and were flattened into a n × n-size
array, resulting to a 1×1024-size array. Each feature array was then
labelled with its corresponding indexed malware family name (i.e.
0 − 24). Then, the features were standardized using Eq. 1.
z =
X − µ
σ
(1)
whereX is the feature to be standardized, µ is its mean value, and
σ is its standard deviation. The standardizationwas implemented us-
ing StandardScaler().fit_transform() of scikit-learn[13].
Granted that the dataset consists of images, and standardization
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Table 1: Malware families found in the Malimg Dataset[12].
No. Family Family Name No. of Variants
01 Dialer Adialer.C 122
02 Backdoor Agent.FYI 116
03 Worm Allaple.A 2949
04 Worm Allaple.L 1591
05 Trojan Alueron.gen!J 198
06 Worm:AutoIT Autorun.K 106
07 Trojan C2Lop.P 146
08 Trojan C2Lop.gen!G 200
09 Dialer Dialplatform.B 177
10 Trojan Downloader Dontovo.A 162
11 Rogue Fakerean 381
12 Dialer Instantaccess 431
13 PWS Lolyda.AA 1 213
14 PWS Lolyda.AA 2 184
15 PWS Lolyda.AA 3 123
16 PWS Lolyda.AT 159
17 Trojan Malex.gen!J 136
18 Trojan Downloader Obfuscator.AD 142
19 Backdoor Rbot!gen 158
20 Trojan Skintrim.N 80
21 Trojan Downloader Swizzor.gen!E 128
22 Trojan Downloader Swizzor.gen!I 132
23 Worm VB.AT 408
24 Trojan Downloader Wintrim.BX 97
25 Worm Yuner.A 800
may not be suitable for such data, but take note that the images
originate from malware binary files. Hence, the features are not
technically images to begin with.
2.4 Computational Models
This section presents the deep learning (DL)models, and the support
vector machine (SVM) classifier used in the study.
2.4.1 Support Vector Machine (SVM). The support vector ma-
chine (SVM) was developed by Vapnik[5] for binary classification.
Its objective is to find the optimal hyperplane f (w, x) = w · x + b
to separate two classes in a given dataset, with features x ∈ Rm .
SVM learns the parameters w and b by solving the following
constrained optimization problem:
min
1
p
wTw +C
p∑
i=1
ξi (2)
s .t y′i (w · x + b) ≥ 1 − ξi (3)
ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,p (4)
where wTw is the Manhattan norm (also known as L1 norm), C
is the penalty parameter (may be an arbitrary value or a selected
value using hyper-parameter tuning), and ξ is a cost function.
The corresponding unconstrained optimization problem of Eq. 2
is given by Eq. 5.
min
1
p
wTw +C
p∑
i=1
max
(
0, 1 − y′i (wT xi + b)
)
(5)
where y′ is the actual label, andwT x+b is the predictor function.
This equation is known as L1-SVM, with the standard hinge loss.
Its differentiable counterpart, L2-SVM (given by Eq. 6), provides
more stable results[16].
min
1
p
∥w∥22 +C
p∑
i=1
max
(
0, 1 − y′i (wT xi + b)
)2 (6)
where ∥w∥2 is the Euclidean norm (also known as L2 norm),
with the squared hinge loss.
Despite intended for binary classification, SVM may be used
for multinomial classification as well. One approach to achieve
this is the use of kernel tricks, which converts a linear model to a
non-linear model by applying kernel functions such as radial basis
function (RBF). However, for this study, we utilized the linear L2-
SVM for the multinomial classification problem. We then employed
the one-versus-all (OvA) approach, which treats a given class ci as
the positive class, and others as negative class.
Take for example the following classes: airplane, boat, car. If a
given image belongs to the airplane class, it is taken as the positive
class, which leaves the other two classes the negative class.
With the OvA approach, the L2-SVM serves as the classifier of
each deep learning model in this study (CNN, GRU, and MLP). That
is, the learning parameters weight and bias of each model is learned
by the SVM.
2.4.2 Convolutional Neural Network. Convolutional Neural Net-
works (CNNs) are similar to feedforward neural networks for they
also consist of hidden layers of neurons with “learnable” parameters.
These neurons receive inputs, performs a dot product, and then
follows it with a non-linearity such as siдmoid or tanh. The whole
network expresses the mapping between raw image pixels x ∈ Rm
and class scores y, f : x 7→ y. For this study, the CNN architecture
used resembles the one laid down in [1]:
(1) INPUT: 32 × 32 × 1
(2) CONV5: 5 × 5 size, 36 filters, 1 stride
(3) LeakyReLU:max(0.01hθ (x)),hθ (x))
(4) POOL: 2 × 2 size, 1 stride
(5) CONV5: 5 × 5 size, 72 filters, 1 stride
(6) LeakyReLU:max(0.01hθ (x)),hθ (x))
(7) POOL: 2 × 2 size, 1 stride
(8) FC: 1024 Hidden Neurons
(9) LeakyReLU:max(0.01hθ (x)),hθ (x))
(10) DROPOUT: p = 0.85
(11) FC: 25 Output Classes
The modification introduced in the architecture design was the
size of layer inputs and outputs (e.g. input of 32 × 32 × 1 instead
of 28 × 28 × 1, and output of 25 classes), the use of LeakyReLU
instead of ReLU, and of course, the introduction of L2-SVM as the
network classifier instead of the conventional Softmax function.
This paradigm of combining CNN and SVM was actually proposed
by Tang (2013)[16].
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2.4.3 Gated Recurrent Unit. Agarap (2017)[3] proposed a neural
network architecture combining the gated recurrent unit (GRU)[4]
variant of a recurrent neural network (RNN) and the support vector
machine (SVM)[5] for the purpose of binary classification.
z = σ (Wz · [ht−1,xt ]) (7)
r = σ (Wr · [ht−1,xt ]) (8)
h˜t = tanh(W · [rt ∗ ht−1,xt ]) (9)
ht = (1 − zt ) ∗ ht−1 + zt ∗ h˜t (10)
where z and r are the update gate and reset gate of a GRU-RNN
respectively, h˜t is the candidate value, and ht is the new RNN cell
state value[4]. In turn, the ht is used as the predictor variable x in
the L2-SVM predictor function (given by wx + b) of the network
instead of the conventional Softmax classifier.
2.4.4 Multilayer Perceptron. The perceptron model was devel-
oped by Rosenblatt (1958)[14] based on the neuron model by Mc-
Culloch & Pitts (1943)[11]. A perceptron may be represented by a
linear function (given by Eq. 11), which is then passed to an acti-
vation function such as sigmoid σ , sign, or tanh. These activation
functions introduce non-linearity (except for the sign function) to
represent complex functions.
As the term itself implies, a multilayer perceptron (MLP) is a
neural network that consists of hidden layers of perceptrons. In this
study, the activation function used was the LeakyReLU[10] function
(given by Eq. 12).
hθ (x) =
n∑
i=0
θixi + b (11)
f
(
hθ (x)
)
=max
(
0.01hθ (x),hθ (x)
)
(12)
The learning parameters weight and bias for each DL model
were learned by the L2-SVM using the loss function given by Eq. 6.
The computed loss is then minimized through Adam[9] optimiza-
tion. Then, the decision function f (x) = siдn(wx + b) produces a
vector of scores for each malware family. In order to get the pre-
dicted labels y for a given data x , the arдmax function is used (see
Eq. 13).
y′ = arдmax
(
siдn(wx + b)) (13)
The arдmax function shall return the indices of the highest
scores across the vector of predicted classes wx + b.
2.5 Data Analysis
There were two phases of experiment for this study: (1) training
phase, and (2) test phase. All the deep learning algorithms described
in Section 2.4 were trained and tested on the Malimg dataset[12].
The dataset was partitioned in the following fashion: 70% for train-
ing phase, and 30% for testing phase.
The variables considered in the experiments were the following:
(1) Test Accuracy (the predictive accuracy on unseen data)
(2) Epochs (number of passes through the entire dataset)
(3) F1 score (harmonic mean of precision and recall, see Eq. 14)
(4) Number of data points
(5) Precision (Positive Predictive Value, see Eq. 15)
(6) Recall (True Positive Rate, see Eq. 16)
F = 2 · PPV · TPR
PPV +TPR
(14)
PPV =
True Positive
True Positive + False Positive
(15)
TPR =
True Positive
True Positive + False Neдative
(16)
The classification measures F1 score, precision, and recall were
all computed using the classification_report() function of
sklearn.metrics[13].
3 RESULTS
All experiments in this study were conducted on a laptop computer
with Intel Core(TM) i5-6300HQ CPU@ 2.30GHz x 4, 16GB of DDR3
RAM, and NVIDIA GeForce GTX 960M 4GB DDR5 GPU. Table 2
shows the hyper-parameters used by the DL-SVM models in the
conducted experiments. Table 3 summarizes the experiment results
for the presented DL-SVM models.
Table 2: Hyper-parameters used in the DL-SVM models.
Hyper-parameters CNN-SVM GRU-SVM MLP-SVM
Batch Size 256 256 256
Cell Size N/A [256 × 5] [512, 256, 128]
No. of Hidden Layers 2 5 3
Dropout Rate 0.85 0.85 None
Epochs 100 100 100
Learning Rate 1e-3 1e-3 1e-3
SVM C 10 10 0.5
As opposed to what [6] did on dataset partitioning, the relative
populations of eachmalware family were not considered in the split-
ting process. All the DL-SVM models were trained on ≈70% of the
preprocessed Malimg dataset[12], i.e. 6400 malware family variants
(6400mod 256 = 0), for 100 epochs. On the other hand, the models
were tested on ≈30% of the preprocessed Malimg dataset[12], i.e.
2560 malware family variants (2560mod 256 = 0), for 100 epochs.
Figure 2 summarizes the training accuracy of the DL-SVM mod-
els for 100 epochs (equivalent to 2500 steps, since 6400×100÷256 =
2500). First, the CNN-SVM model accomplished its training in
3 minutes and 41 seconds with an average training accuracy of
Table 3: Summary of experiment results on the DL-SVM
models.
Variables CNN-SVM GRU-SVM MLP-SVM
Accuracy 77.2265625% 84.921875% 80.46875%
Data points 256000 256000 256000
Epochs 100 100 100
F1 0.79 0.85 0.81
Precision 0.84 0.85 0.83
Recall 0.77 0.85 0.80
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Figure 2: Plotted using matplotlib[8]. Training accuracy
of the DL-SVM models on malware classification using
the Malimg dataset[12].
80.96875%. Meanwhile, the GRU-SVMmodel accomplished its train-
ing in 11 minutes and 32 seconds with an average training accuracy
of 90.9375%. Lastly, the MLP-SVM model accomplished its training
in 12 seconds with an average training accuracy of 99.5768229%.
Figure 3: Plotted using matplotlib[8]. Confusion Matrix
for CNN-SVM testing results, showing its predictive ac-
curacy for each malware family described in Table 1.
Figure 3 shows the testing performance of CNN-SVM model
in multinomial classification on malware families. The mentioned
model had a precision of 0.84, a recall of 0.77, and a F1 score of 0.79.
Figure 4 shows the testing performance of GRU-SVM model
in multinomial classification on malware families. The mentioned
model had a precision of 0.85, a recall of 0.85, and a F1 score of 0.85.
Figure 5 shows the testing performance of MLP-SVM model
in multinomial classification on malware families. The mentioned
model had a precision of 0.83, a recall of 0.80, and a F1 score of 0.81.
As shown in the confusion matrices, the DL-SVM models had
better scores for the malware families with the high number of
variants, most notably, Allaple.A and Allaple.L. This may be
pointed to the omission of relative populations of each malware
family during the partitioning of the dataset into training data and
Figure 4: Plotted using matplotlib[8]. Confusion Matrix
for GRU-SVM testing results, showing its predictive ac-
curacy for each malware family described in Table 1.
Figure 5: Plotted using matplotlib[8]. Confusion Matrix
forMLP-SVM testing results, showing its predictive accu-
racy for each malware family described in Table 1.
testing data. However, unlike the results of [6], only Allaple.A
and Allaple.L had some misclassifications between them.
4 DISCUSSION
It is palpable that the GRU-SVM model stands out among the DL-
SVM models presented in this study. This finding comes as no
surprise as the GRU-SVM model did have the relatively most so-
phisticated architecture design among the presented models, most
notably, its 5-layer design. As explained in [7], the number of layers
of a neural network is directly proportional to the complexity of
a function it can represent. In other words, the performance or
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accuracy of a neural network is directly proportional to the number
of its hidden layers. By this logic, it stands to reason that the less
number of hidden layers that a neural network has, the less its
performance or accuracy is. Hence, the findings in this study cor-
roborates the literature explanation as the MLP-SVM came second
(having ≈80.47% test accuracy) to GRU-SVM with a 3-layer design,
and the CNN-SVM came last (having ≈77.23% test accuracy) with a
2-layer design.
The reported test accuracy of ≈84.92% clearly states that the
GRU-SVM model has the strongest predictive performance among
the DL-SVM models in this study. This is attributed to the fact that
the GRU-SVMmodel has the relatively most complex design among
the presented models. First, its 5-layer design allows it to represent
increasingly complex mappings between features and labels, i.e.
function mappings f : x 7→ y. Second, its capability to learn from
data of sequential nature, in which an image data belongs. This
nature of the GRU-RNN comes from its gating mechanisms, given
by equations in Section 2.4.3. Through the mentioned mechanisms,
the GRU-RNN solves the problem of vanishing gradients and ex-
ploding gradients[4]. Thus, being able to connect information with
a considerable gap. However, as indicated by the training summary
given by Figure 2, the GRU-SVM has the caveat of relatively longer
computing time. Having finished its training in 11 minutes and 32
seconds, it was the slowest among the DL-SVM models. From a
high-level inspection of the presented equations of each DL-SVM
model (CNN-SVM in Section 2.4.2, GRU-SVM in Section 2.4.3, and
MLP-SVM in Section 2.4.4), it was a theoretical implication that the
GRU-SVM would have the longest computing time as it had more
non-linearities introduced in its computation. On the other hand,
with the least non-linearities (having only used LeakyReLU), it was
also theoretically implied that the MLP-SVM model would have the
shortest computing time.
From the literature explanation[7] and empirical evidence, it
can be inferred that increasing the complexity of the architectural
design (e.g. more hidden layers, better non-linearities) of the CNN-
SVM and MLP-SVM models may catapult their predictive perfor-
mance, and would be more on par with the GRU-SVM model. In
turn, this implication warrants a further study and exploration that
may be prolific to the information security community.
5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
We used the Malimg dataset prepared by [12], which consists of
malware images for the purpose of malware family classification.
We employed deep learning models with the L2-SVM as their final
output layer in a multinomial classification task. The empirical data
shows that the GRU-SVM model by [3] had the highest predictive
accuracy among the presented DL-SVM models, having a test accu-
racy of ≈84.92%.
Improving the architecture design of the CNN-SVM model and
MLP-SVM model by adding more hidden layers, adding better non-
linearities, and/or using an optimized dropout, may provide better
insights on their application on malware classification. Such in-
sights may reveal an information as to which architecture may
serve best in the engineering of an intelligent anti-malware system.
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